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Complementarity problemWhile there exists extensive literature on the ﬁrst- and second-best tolling of congested
transportation networks, much of it presumes the existence of a single agent responsible
for toll-setting. The present paper extends the small but growing body of work studying
the impact of several agents independently regulating tolls on different parts of a network.
Speciﬁcally we consider the problem of a network consisting of two ‘cities’, each city
independently regulated by a city ‘authority’ able to set a single cordon toll for entry to
the city. It is supposed that each authority aims to maximise the social welfare of its
own residents, anticipating the impact of its toll on travellers’ route and demand decisions,
while reacting to the toll level levied by the other authority. In addition, we model the
possibility of the cities entering into a ‘tax-exporting agreement’, in which city A agrees
to share with city B the toll revenues it collects from city B residents using city A’s network.
It is assumed that the sensitivity of travellers, in terms of their route and demand
responses, is captured by an elastic demand, Stochastic User Equilibrium (SUE) model.
Conditions for a Nash Equilibrium (NE) between cities are set out as an Equilibrium
Problem with Equilibrium Constraints (EPEC). It is shown that weaker, ‘local’ solutions to
the EPEC (which we term LNE for local NE) satisfy a single variational inequality, using
the smooth implicit function of the SUE map. Standard variational algorithms may then
be used to identify such LNE solutions, allowing NE solutions to be identiﬁed from this can-
didate set; we test the use of a Sequential Linear Complementarity Problem algorithm.
Numerical results are reported in which we see that the sensitivity of travellers may affect
many factors, including: the number of LNE solutions, the initial conditions for which
algorithms might determine such solutions, the gap between LNE and a global regulator
solution, and the incentive for cities to cooperate in terms of tax-exporting.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
There are many ways in which transport authorities may inﬂuence travel behaviour in some socially-desirable manner
through pricing mechanisms. One such instrument which has attracted considerable research attention is the use of road
tolls—levied on drivers when using a transport facility or crossing a city cordon, for example—so as to both manage the
demand for private car travel and to inﬂuence route choice. Much of the literature on tolling has focused on a benevolent
regulator who sets tolls on the whole or some part of a congested transportation network so as to maximise some measure
Nomenclature
Symbol Interpretation
A, B Authorities A and B
j  j cardinality operator
y ¼ SOLðÞ y is obtained as the solution of the functions in parenthesis
# matrix transpose operator
h logit dispersion parameter
L index set of links in the trafﬁc network L ¼ f1;2; . . . ; jLjg
si a single toll level chosen for links within authority i; i 2 fA;Bg such that s ¼ ðsA; sBÞ#
v l link ﬂows for link l; l 2 L collected in vector form as v ¼ ðv1; v2; . . . ; v jLjÞ#
tl(vl) generalised travel time as a separable, differentiable and monotonically increasing function of link ﬂow on
link l when the ﬂow on link l is v l; l 2 f1;2; . . . ; jLjg and collected in vector form as
tðvÞ ¼ ðt1ðv1Þ; t2ðv2Þ; . . . ; tjLjðv jLjÞÞ#
K index set of Origin Destination (OD) pairs in the network K ¼ f1;2; . . . ; jKjg
qk the travel demand (level) for OD movement k. K ¼ f1;2; . . . ; jKjg and collected in vector form as
q ¼ ðq1; q2; . . . ; qjKjÞ#
K jLj  2 Toll link-authority incidence matrix K, with elements deﬁned as follows:
Kli ¼ 1; if link l; l 2 L may be tolled by authority i; i 2 fA;Bg0;otherwise

R the index set of all acyclic routes, R ¼ f1;2; . . . ; jRjg and Rk#R, is the subset serving OD pair k; k 2 f1;2;
. . . ; jKjg.
D jLj  jRj link-route incidence matrix, with elements deﬁned as follows:
Dlr ¼ 1; if link l; l 2 L is part of route r; r 2 f1;2; . . . ; jRjg0; otherwise

C |K|  |R| OD-route incidence matrix with elements deﬁned as follows:
Ckr ¼ 1; if r 2 Rk; k 2 f1;2; . . . ; jKjg; r 2 f1;2; . . . ; jRjg0;otherwise

D (convex) demand-feasible set
f vector of path ﬂows
c½k the vector of route cost for OD movement k. k ¼ f1;2; . . . ; jKjg
prðc½k; hÞ for OD pair k, k 2 f1;2; . . . ; jKjg, probability of using route r, r 2 Rk when the perceived distribution of
route utilities is parameterized in a random utility model by c[k] and h. This is collected in vector form
as p½kðc½k; hÞ
skðc½k; hÞ composite generalised travel time function for OD pair k, k 2 f1;2; . . . ; jKjg and collected in vector form
sðc; hÞ
dkðskÞ separable, bounded, continuously differentiable and monotonically decreasing demand function for OD
pair k, k 2 f1;2; . . . ; jKjg such that qk ¼ dkðskÞ is the demand level for OD movement kwhen that OD move-
ment’s composite generalised travel time is sk. These functions are collected in vector form as
dðsÞ ¼ ðd1ðs1Þ; d2ðs2Þ; . . . ;djKjðsjKjÞÞ#
gkðqkÞ the inverse demand function for OD pair k, k 2 f1;2; . . . ; jKjg such that sk ¼ gkðqkÞ is the OD composite
generalised travel time with demand level qk
t0l free ﬂow travel time for link l; l 2 L
WGLOBALðv;q; sÞ global welfare measure
hðsÞ global welfare measure as a function of tolls given that link ﬂows and demands are implicitly deﬁned by a
SUE model
vðAÞ;vðBÞ disaggregation of link ﬂows by resident authority origin of trips such that v ¼ vðAÞ þ vðBÞ
qðAÞ;qðBÞ disaggregation of demands by resident authority origin of trips such that q ¼ qðAÞ þ qðBÞ
W0AðvðAÞ;vðBÞ;qðAÞ;qðBÞ; sAjsBÞ welfare measure for Authority A computed at equilibrium link ﬂows and demands
dependent on the tolls set by opposing authority without tax exporting (a = 0) given sB
W1AðvðAÞ;vðBÞ;qðAÞ;qðBÞ; sAjsBÞ welfare measure for Authority A computed at equilibrium link ﬂows and demands
dependent on the tolls set by opposing authority with tax exporting (a = 1) given sB
XðAÞ jKj  jKj diagonal matrix with elements deﬁned as follows:
XðAÞkk ¼
1; if OD movement k has an origin in authority A;
0; otherwise
8<
:
XðBÞ jKj  jKj diagonal matrix with elements deﬁned as follows:
XðBÞkk ¼
1; if OD movement k has an origin in authority B;
0; otherwise
8<
:
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hðsÞ vector of welfare objective of each authority
h0ðsÞ ﬁrst order derivative of hðsÞ
rh0ðs0Þ a 2 by 2 Jacobian matrix of h0ðsÞwith respect to toll level evaluated at toll vector s0. Diagonal elements are
@h0iðs0i Þ
@s0i
; i 2 fA;BgÞoff diagonal elements are given by ð@h
0
iðs0i Þ
@s0j
Þ; i 2 fA;Bgi–j
Lðsjs0Þ ﬁrst order Taylor (linear) approximation of h0ðsÞ at toll vector s0
D.P. Watling et al. / Transportation Research Part B 76 (2015) 93–116 95of social welfare (e.g. Verhoef et al., 1996; Yang and Lam, 1996; Hearn and Ramana, 1998). This literature is fundamentally
based on the economic argument that drivers in congested conditions should be charged a toll so that they recognise the
delay they cause to others, i.e. through ‘‘internalization’’ of the externality (Pigou, 1920; Yang and Huang, 2005). This litera-
ture assumes the regulator to be concerned with the social welfare of all users in the network, and that they are the single
agent responsible for setting toll levels.
In reality, however, transportation systems may have several agents able to inﬂuence pricing in some way, each with its
own jurisdiction and potentially conﬂicting objectives. Reﬂecting such considerations and the growing political inclination
toward deregulation, a burgeoning literature (to which our work is closely related) is emerging in the toll pricing literature
on the regulation and ownership of private toll roads, motivated by global interests in highway franchising (Engel et al.,
1997; Tan et al., 2010; Tan and Yang, 2012). Apace with the development of theory, real-life systems of this nature are
increasingly apparent. For example, there are several toll roads developed as part of Public Private Partnerships in com-
petition with each other in the Australian cities of Brisbane, Melbourne and Sydney (Li and Hensher, 2010).
In terms of theoretical analysis of competition in highway networks, both Verhoef et al. (1996) and de Palma and Lindsey
(2000) considered, amongst other scenarios, a private toll road operator in competition with a toll-free route. The authors
demonstrated that a private toll road operator would be incentivized to internalize the congestion externality on the toll
road. This conclusion was supported in further work by Engel et al. (2004) and Acemoglu and Ozdaglar (2007) who conjec-
tured that when several operators competed on parallel routes to maximise revenue, toll competition would substitute for
toll regulation and that in the limit, this would in fact be equal to the welfare maximising toll level. This body of work, how-
ever, was limited to the case of routes in parallel. On the other hand, it has been established in the literature (e.g. Mills, 1995;
Small and Verhoef, 2007; Mun and Ahn, 2008; van den Berg, 2013) that if each link in a serial network was controlled by a
different private operator, each operator would independently set tolls not only to internalize the externality of the link
under their control but also the externalities of other links in the series. This would imply excessively high tolls and hence
result in a welfare loss. This is a manifestation of ‘‘double marginalization’’, a phenomenon recognised in the industrial
economics literature (Economides and Salop, 1992).
While the above works all focused on competition between several private operators, it is generally the case that highway
networks span jurisdictional boundaries which are effectively artiﬁcial demarcations, meaning that even without private
involvement there exists competition, but in this case between competing public organisations. To this end, De Borger
et al. (2005) studied the case where several public organisations such as city authorities use tolls in competition with each
other. They considered local and through trafﬁc in a serial network setting, and found that governments would impose inefﬁ-
cient tolls on links which they control. They argue that this is a result of ‘tax exporting’ behaviour, whereby any authority
charging tolls on non-residents of their jurisdiction is effectively transferring revenue across the jurisdictional boundaries.
The analysis was extended in De Borger et al. (2007) to allow for simultaneous toll and capacity choices by the governments.
These papers motivate the work presented in this paper, where (unlike the focus of much literature on competing private
operators), the main actors in the game we shall formulate will be public city authorities that are in competition with each
other.
Understanding the nature and outcome of the interactions between competing public bodies is important for several rea-
sons. Many authors have argued that the state of institutional governance of transport is critical for the successful delivery of
policy (Pemberton, 2000; Marsden and May, 2006). Pemberton illustrates the interaction of decision makers in local govern-
ment during the design of integrated transport strategies for funding of transport improvements for the North East region of
England. Ofﬁcials in the areas of Sunderland, North Tyneside, South Tyneside and Gateshead perceived an ‘‘over dominance
in terms of policy determination by Newcastle City Council’’ (Pemberton, 2000, p. 300). Marsden and May (2006) point to, on
the one hand, the fear of competition between restrictive parking charges in city centres for trafﬁc management purposes,
and on the other hand, the loss of retail to outlying retail parks offering cheap and plentiful parking. We can thus see that
there are several different kinds of competition possible between public bodies. In this sense, it is helpful in the ﬁrst instance
to distinguish between horizontal and vertical ﬁscal competition in the context of competition between authorities (De
Borger and Proost, 2012). By vertical competition, we mean the potential for higher and lower level governments to tax
the same tax base. In contrast, horizontal competition implies the desire of governments (at the same level such as city
authorities in the UK or states in the US) to shift the tax burden to users from other jurisdictions.
We may then ask, how might these different kinds of public competition be evident in a transport policy context? Both
Levinson (2001) and Rork (2009) addressed this question using an empirical approach to study the issue of ‘tax exporting’
behaviour across states in the US. They found econometric evidence to support the hypothesis that tolls were used as an
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ently the more likely the state would be to levy tolls. Proost and Sen (2006), on the other hand, utilised a strategic model to
explore the issue of tax-exporting behaviour and its potentially negative impacts, studying interactions between govern-
ments at two different levels, i.e. an example of vertical competition. In their model, a regional government was assumed
to be in charge of setting tolls for a cordon, while a local government had control of parking charges. They concluded that
there was the possibility for extensive welfare losses if the authorities did not cooperate in the application of these instru-
ments. They showed that in such cases most of the explanation for the inefﬁciency was attributable to the desire for tax-
exporting behaviour by the city government, which tended to extract very high parking charges from ‘‘commuters’’, that
is, residents of the wider region who were not residents of the city and who travelled into the city area. While Proost and
Sen’s model had no representation of the road network, Ubbels and Verhoef (2008) considered horizontal competition in
a serial network (with no route choice) where each government was assumed to have simultaneous toll and capacity setting
decisions. They demonstrated, through numerical simulations, that horizontal competition between governments may have
a negative impact on welfare.
Our focus in this paper is on horizontal competition, such as that which may occur between physically-adjacent jurisdic-
tional regions, which we refer to as ‘competing cities’, with each ‘city authority’ able to determine the toll regime in its own
city in order to tax private transportation. The ‘competition’ arises from two aspects. Firstly, the travellers who are resident
in one city may use the transportation network of the non-resident city and therefore face the tolls set by either or both city
authorities; therefore there is a dependence of the welfare of the residents of one city on the tolls set by both city authorities.
Secondly, we allow for the potential for there to be some agreement between the authorities in terms of ‘tax export’, i.e. that
a fraction of the toll revenue from non-residents of a city will be passed to their resident authority. Our interest is speciﬁcally
in doing so in the context of congested networks where there are heterogeneous origin–destination movements, and the
potential for travellers to potentially re-route or not travel by private transport, in order to avoid paying tolls. This provides
an additional dimension to the two direct aspects of the competition between cities, in that the travellers themselves are also
‘competing’ (for scarce road space). This means that to effectively set tolls even from their own perspective (regardless of
other city authorities), then a city must anticipate the impact of their policy on the behaviour of the travellers both inside
and outside their jurisdiction. From the large body of academic work on tolling problems, we now know that these traveller
responses are highly dependent on network structure and the location of activities relative to any tolled part of the network
(May and Milne, 2000), since these critically affect the potential to re-route. Therefore, aside from our focus on horizontal as
opposed to vertical competition, our work is unlike that of Proost and Sen (2006) in that we employ a detailed network
representation with the potential for re-routing.
In our model formulation, we utilise tolls as the only strategic variable over which the authorities exercise control. This is
in contrast to other authors (Xiao et al., 2007; Yang et al., 2009) who assume that the private operators play a single shot
game in both determining tolls and capacities simultaneously based on a Nash game. Thus our work relates closely to that
of Zhang et al. (2011), and extends our own recent work reported in Gühnemann et al. (2011, 2014) and Koh et al. (2012).
These studies also used detailed trafﬁc network models to study the effects of competition between city authorities. A key
element of all these studies was, as in the case of private tolling literature, that the trafﬁc assignment was based on
Wardrop’s User Equilibrium (UE) assignment (Wardrop, 1952). However, there are several technical difﬁculties and issues
that arise from such an assumption. Firstly, when we include the potential for partial tax-exporting agreements in the objec-
tive function for each city, then we need to know link ﬂows disaggregated by originating city, but in general these are not
uniquely deﬁned by the UEmodel at given toll levels. Therefore such objective functions are typically not well-deﬁned unless
highly restrictive assumptions are made on the network structure and permitted tolls to enforce such uniqueness (see Koh
et al., 2012). Secondly, even in the limited cases where uniqueness can be assured, the UE ﬂows are non-smooth when
viewed as an implicit mapping from the tolls to equilibrium ﬂows. Thus, one cannot readily exploit the typically smooth nat-
ure of the social welfare functions with standard gradient-based optimisation methods. Thirdly, the overall nature of the
resulting problem (as an Equilibrium Problem with Equilibrium Constraints, EPEC) is known to have an especially complex
and special mathematical structure, which limits the opportunities for testing alternative solution strategies. We show that
our approach, on the other hand, can be cast in a form to requires the solution only of a single-level variational inequality,
thus opening up the problem to a range of possible solution algorithms Fourthly, it has been shown that such problems
may have a range of ‘local’ and ‘global’ solutions that may emerge (Koh et al., 2012), yet it is unclear how sensitive these
ﬁndings are to the UE assumption of identical, perfect information of the travellers; with even a small dispersion in beha-
viour and change in sensitivity of the travellers, would the same phenomena arise?
In the present paper, in order to address all four of the concerns above, we instead adopt a Stochastic User Equilibrium
(SUE) model, focusing on the particular case of two cities competing over a cordon toll level. In Section 2, we develop the
appropriate welfare functions for the competing cities, inclusive of partial tax-exporting agreements, which we show to
be well-deﬁned under the SUE model. These objective functions form the basis of the two-level game, with cities competing
at the upper level and travellers competing for road space at the lower level. We then go on to develop an equivalent
formulation, in which certain ‘local’ solutions of this two-level game may be cast as a single-level variational inequality
problem. Having deﬁned the solution algorithm (Section 3), Section 4 is devoted to numerical experiments, where we
explore the sensitivity of the resulting solutions to various parameters of the model, and discuss the implications of the
ﬁndings for policy. Section 5 concludes.
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2.1. Basic notation and assumptions
We represent the highway network as a graph consisting of links indexed by the set L ¼ f1;2; . . . ; jLjg. We suppose there
to be two regulatory authorities (labelled A and B), each authority having their own pre-deﬁned subset of network links over
which they may charge a toll. These potentially-tolled links are identiﬁed by means of a link-authority incidence matrixK of
dimension jLj  2 with elements Kli equal to 1 only if link l may be tolled by authority i and equal to 0 otherwise
ðl 2 f1;2; . . . ; jLjg; i 2 fA;BgÞ. We make the restriction in the present paper that each authority i has a single, non-negative
toll level si 2 [0,1) that they may determine and levy on their tollable links. Since we assume that all users perceive the
tolls in the same way, regardless of their socio-economic attributes, we shall assume the tolls to be in equivalent travel time
units; that is to say, what we refer to as the ‘toll’ is effectively the monetary charge divided by the common value-of-time.
Such an assumption is not necessary, but we believe considerably helps the appreciation of our later numerical experiments,
where we can present tolls in such equivalent travel time units, without having to consider the important but quite separate
issues of different units of currency and values-of-time (the assumption is justiﬁed by the fact that we consider only a single
class of travellers, whereas a natural multi-class extension of our work would more easily be derived with tolls in monetary
units and explicit values-of-time by class). Together, the two tolls to be determined can be collected in the vector s = (sA, sB)#
with # denoting the transpose, with non-negativity constraints on the elements of the toll vector denoted sP 0.
Aside from tolls, other factors will motivate travellers in terms of whether to travel and which route to take. We focus here
only on travel time, since it is sufﬁcient to illustrate our modelling approach.1We denote by v the vector of ﬂows on the links of
the network, with typical element vl denoting the ﬂow on link l (for l = 1, 2, . . ., |L|). Then the function tl(v) denotes the travel time
on link lwhen the link ﬂows are v. Then tðvÞ ¼ ðt1ðvÞ; t2ðvÞ; . . . ; tjLjðvÞÞ# denotes the vector mapping from link ﬂows to link travel
times. We suppose the vector function t() to be differentiable and monotone in the sense of Cantarella (1997).
As well as links, the network consists of several other, mutually-dependent entities. Firstly, there are Origin–Destination
(OD) movements which are indexed by the set K = {1, 2, . . ., |K|}, with qk (k 2 K) denoting the travel demand for OD
movement k. Secondly, the routes in the network are labelled such that R ¼ f1;2; . . . ; jRjg denotes the index set of all
acyclic routes, with Rk#R, the subset of routes serving OD pair k 2 {1, 2, . . ., |K|}. The relationship between routes and links
is speciﬁed through the jLj  jRj link-route incidence matrix D, with elements Dlr equal to 1 only if link l is part of route r,
and equal to 0 otherwise ðl ¼ 1;2; . . . ; jLj; r ¼ 1;2; . . . ; jRjÞ. The relationship between routes and OD movements is speciﬁed
through the |K|  |R| OD-route incidence matrix C with elements Ckr equal to 1 if r 2 Rk and equal to 0 otherwise
(k = 1, 2, . . ., |K|). The convex set of feasible combinations of the OD travel demand vector q and the link ﬂow vector v is
denoted by:1 In t
the tolls
still theD ¼ fðv;qÞ : v ¼ Df and q ¼ Cf; where f P 0; f 2 RjRjg: ð1Þ
In terms of modelling route choice, we suppose that those individuals who decide to make a journey will choose between the
available routes in proportions given by a random utility model. Our notational convention is to use a square bracket around
an index to highlight cases where the index is referring to a partition of a vector rather than an individual element if it. Thus,
we write qk (without square brackets on the index) to refer to the element of the vector q that refers to OD movement k,
whereas we write c[k] with a square bracket around the index just to highlight to the reader that this is referring to a partition
of the vector c (i.e. so c[k] is itself a vector, not an individual element, as indicated also by the fact that c is in non-italic, bold-
face), namely the vector of elements of c that relate to OD movement k.
For each ODmovement k 2 {1, 2, . . ., |K|} let (p[k](c[k];h)) denote the vector function with elements prðc½k; hÞðr 2 RkÞ , these
elements denoting the proportion of travellers who would select route r on OD movement kwhen the perceived distribution
of route utilities is parameterized in a random utility model by c[k] and h. For the multinomial logit model in particular, these
elements are given by:prðc½k; hÞ ¼
expðhcrÞP
s2Rk expðhcsÞ
; ðr 2 Rk; k ¼ 1;2; . . . ; jKjÞ: ð2ÞWe then deﬁne p(c;h) to be the vector function:pðc; hÞ ¼ ðp½1ðc½1; hÞ;p½2ðc½2; hÞ; . . . ;p½jKjðc½jKj; hÞÞ#: ð3Þ
Associated with the choice probability function, we shall also deﬁne the functions sk(c[k];h) for each OD movement k:skðc½k; hÞ ¼ 1h ln
X
r2Rk
CkrðexpðhcrÞÞ
 !
; ðk ¼ 1;2; . . . ; jKjÞ: ð4Þhe more general case, assuming the inﬂuences to be link-additive, the function tl() for each link l contains the combined effect of all factors other than
, scaled to be in equivalent travel time units, so can be termed the ‘generalised travel time exclusive of tolls’. The stimulus to route choice and demand is
n, as it is here, the sum of the tolls (in equivalent time units) and these other factors, i.e. the generalised travel time.
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(2001), following Williams (1977), referred to this as a composite cost (in the case when the ck are measuring generalised
cost), a term commonly used by those working with nested logit demand models. From a network assignment perspective,
Shefﬁ (1985) developed such an expression from what he termed the satisfaction function. Shefﬁ considered two kinds of
satisfaction; in the ﬁrst, satisfaction (as one might expect by the word) is measuring an increasingly desirable characteristic.
It is measured in the units of systematic utility, being the expected maximum utility, and for the logit model above is given
by ln
PRk
r¼1CkrðexpðhcrÞÞ
 
. In the second kind of ‘‘satisfaction’’, and the one we shall adopt, Shefﬁ effectively scaled the
expected maximum utility to be in the same units as the ck by dividing by h, yielding expression (4). In this case ‘‘satisfac-
tion’’ is a potentially misleading word, since (4) is no longer measuring a desirable attribute, However, these ambiguous
names for the entity in (4) can be found throughout the networks literature. For example, Maher et al. (2005) refer to this
expression as both a ‘‘satisfaction’’ and a composite travel cost; Ying and Yang (2005) refer to this entity as a disutility,
which better captures its undesirability, but then is misleading in terms of units, since it is measuring something on the
scale of ck not of utility. Based on this discussion, we feel that the term ‘composite cost’ best captures both the nature
and units of this measure, except that in our case ck has been deﬁned as a measure of generalised travel time rather than
generalised travel cost; therefore, we shall use the term composite generalised travel time to describe the output of the func-
tions in (4).
These composite generalised travel time functions can be neatly brought together in vector notation as:sðc; hÞ ¼ h1 lnðC expðhcÞÞ ð5Þwhere ln(x) and exp(x) for vector argument x denote element-by-element application of the respective function.
Turning attention to the demand for travel, for each origin–destination movement k, a separable, bounded (uniformly
above), differentiable and monotonically decreasing demand function dk() is assumed, such that dk(sk) is the demand level
for OD movement k when that OD movement’s composite generalised travel time is sk, for k 2 K. Under these assumptions,
the demand function for each k has an inverse, and we refer to that inverse function as gk(), such that gk(qk) is the OD com-
posite generalised travel time that would give rise to a demand of qk. Collectively we refer to the demand functions for all
movements by the vector function d(s) = (d1(s1), d2(s2), . . ., d|K|(s|K|))#.
It is useful to highlight some of the assumptions we have made, and particularly the potential for them to be generalised
or extended:
 As we adopt an SUE approach we can move unambiguously between link-based and route-based formulations of the
problem. In the analysis below we shall generally suppose that Rk denotes the universal set of acyclic routes available
for OD movement k, but the analysis would hold equally in the case where a pre-deﬁned subset of the universal set is
deﬁned (see Connors et al., 2007, for such an example).
 In our SUE approach below we shall restrict attention to the case of a multinomial logit choice model, which has the
advantage that the satisfaction function is available in closed form. However, a similar approach could in principle be
adopted for other kinds of SUE model, for example extending the work for a single city authority with probit SUE route
choice reported in Connors et al. (2007).
 In the multinomial logit speciﬁcation, the dispersion parameter h is assumed to be common to all OD movements, but the
approach below is trivially modiﬁed to permit a different h for each OD movement. In terms of computational demands,
such a modiﬁcation would be analogous to moving to a multi-class SUE problem with different h (Van Vuren andWatling,
1991; Lo and Szeto, 2002). While each SUE problem would, as a result, be longer to solve, the structure of the overall
problems would be the same, and so we have no reason to expect the number of SUE evaluations to increase, and still
we can use the same concepts, such as use of sensitivity analysis, and the single-level formulation of the resulting
EPEC presented below.
 Our formulation assumes that each authority only has a single decision variable at their disposal, namely the common toll
level to charge on all links pre-identiﬁed as tollable. We have in mind a situation where each authority has a cordon they
have identiﬁed and will charge each time the cordon is crossed as this is a common way of implementing pricing in the
few cities that have introduced it (namely Milan, Oslo, Stockholm, and Singapore). Limiting our consideration to the case
of cordons with a common toll is obviously important for the way we present the results, but there is no methodological
reason for this, we could just as easily have tolls differing by link.
 We restrict attention to a single user class speciﬁcation. Under such an assumption, it is no further restriction to assume
that the tolls are expressed in equivalent time units, since the value-of-time is common to all users.
 The major complication in our extending our two-authority model to three or more authorities would be the issue of how
to handle any tax-exporting behaviour in the competing objective functions, given the various combinations that can
arise of a resident of authority i paying a toll to travel on the network of authority j. Restricting attention to two authori-
ties simpliﬁes the conceptual side of understanding the competing behaviour, but the approach would be extensible in
the future to cases of three or more authorities.
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Returning to the particular assumptions adopted in the present paper, then given any toll vector sP 0, it is supposed that
OD travel demand and routing patterns are determined by an elastic demand, Stochastic User Equilibrium (SUE) (e.g. Maher
et al., 2005). Before moving on to the case of primary interest in this paper, that of competing authorities, we shall consider
ﬁrstly the simpler case of a single authority, since a detailed understanding of that case is helpful for the extensions we make
to multi-authority problems. The solutions to this problem also prove to be a useful reference point for our subsequent
numerical analyses, reported in Section 4.
Therefore, let us imagine, contrary to the case described so far, that the toll vector s is to be decided by a single regulatory
authority, aiming to maximise social welfare, which for an SUE-based model is given by the objective function:WGLOBALðv;q; sÞ ¼
XjKj
k¼1
Z qk
0
gkðxÞdx ðh1q# lnfC expðhD#ðtðvÞ þ KsÞÞg  ðKsÞ#vÞ: ð6ÞThis objective function has been used in a variety of studies such as Huang et al. (2000) and Ying and Yang (2005). The ﬁrst
term on the right-hand side objective above is the Marshallian measure capturing the user beneﬁt of the trips made. In order
to obtain social welfare, we must then subtract the ‘user cost’ capturing the travel time impacts, namely the total ‘price’
stimulus (generalised travel time = travel time + tolls in equivalent time units) net of any tolls paid. Thus, the bracketed term
is the total composite generalised travel time, based on (4) and (5), net of the total tolls paid (or total revenue). As a measure
of welfare, it can be seen that (6) is equivalent to the sum of consumer surplus and revenue. A detailed discussion of the
derivation of this measure can be found in the citations above, as is for the similar function derived in the case of UE
(see, for example, Verhoef et al., 2010). Then we may deﬁne an SUE-based Global Regulatory Problem, to parallel the UE-
based Global Regulatory Problem of Lawphongpanich and Hearn (2004). This will have the form of a Mathematical
Program with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC) given by:Maximise WGLOBALðv;q; sÞ
subject to ðv;qÞ 2 D
sP 0
v ¼ Dq pðD#ðtðvÞ þ KsÞ; hÞ
q ¼ dðh1 lnfC expðhD#ðtðvÞ þ KsÞgÞ:
ð7ÞThis problem can be solved as a standard non-linear programming problem by embedding the SUE conditions as constraints.
There are three key properties to remark on the constraints to this problem:
1. Under the stated assumptions above on the travel time functions, it follows that the vector of generalised link travel time
functions, given by tðvÞ þ Ks, is continuous, separable and monotonically increasing in v. Coupled with the assumptions
above on the demand function d(), this implies that there is a unique elastic SUE solution (v, q) 2 D for any given sP 0
(Cantarella, 1997). Thus, the ﬁxed point constraints to (7) deﬁne a single (v, q) given s, and so we may equivalently max-
imise only with respect to sP 0while leaving (v, q) as free variables (with values to be determined by the constraints for
any given s).
2. Since by construction the functions p() and d() map to the feasible region D, then the only solution to the ﬁxed point
conditions over ðv;qÞ 2 RjAjþjKj (for given s) is the unique SUE allocation in D, and therefore we can relax the condition
(v, q) 2 D as an explicit constraint.
3. The assumptions given ensure that the elastic SUE solution, viewed as an implicit function of s, is smooth (differentiable);
this result can be obtained, even for the case of non-separable travel time functions, by a trivial adaptation of the proof in
Section 3 of Connors et al. (2007). This motivates the use of the differentiable implicit functions given by:ðvðsÞ;qðsÞÞ ¼ SOL ðv;qÞ 2 RjAjþjKj v ¼ Dq pðD
#ðtðvÞ þ KsÞ; hÞ
q ¼ dðh1 lnfC expðhD#ðtðvÞ þ KsÞgÞ

( )( )
ð8ÞSince, by inspection of (7) the upper level objective WGLOBAL is a differentiable function of its arguments, then by function
composition combined with the three properties above, it follows that by the Implicit Function Theorem we may obtain a
smooth, single-level problem equivalent to (7), by using (8), as:Maximise hðsÞ ¼ WGLOBALðvðsÞ;qðsÞ; sÞ
subject to sP 0
ð9ÞAlthough the objective function h is non-convex, the possibility to evaluate gradients of h with respect to s (using
sensitivity analysis of the ﬁxed point problem (8)) provides the possibility to search for local stationary points using standard
gradient-based solvers (Connors et al., 2007). This is something distinctive about adopting an SUE as opposed to UE con-
straint in the MPEC.
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considerable simpliﬁcation of the resulting MPEC, yet the discussion above is restricted to the case of a single operator max-
imising the total welfare. It is therefore natural to investigate the properties of an SUE-based formulation in the context of
interest to the present paper, namely that of multiple, competing authorities, which we begin to formulate in the next sub-
section.
2.3. Formulation of authority-speciﬁc objective functions
In the case of competing authorities, we assume that each authority has jurisdiction over setting tolls on its own set of
links, but that its responsibility is only to trips that originate in its area. Thus, as a ﬁrst step, we partition our OD demand and
link ﬂow variables, such that:v ¼ vðAÞ þ vðBÞ; q ¼ qðAÞ þ qðBÞ ð10Þ
where v(A) and v(B) are column vectors of dimension jLj respectively denoting the link ﬂows from origins in authority A and B,
and where q(A) and q(B) are column vectors of dimension |K| respectively denoting the OD demands from origins in authority
A and B.
Let us ﬁrst consider Authority A. Authority A is assumed to be aiming to maximise the social welfare of its own residents
by adjusting the toll level of links over which it has control, anticipating the impact of the toll on travellers’ route and demand
decisions, but reacting to the toll level levied by Authority B. That is to say, Authority A does not anticipate the effect that
their own choice of toll will have on Authority B’s response, but they simply react to the toll set by Authority B. Let us assume
for the moment that Authority B has already decided its toll level sB P 0, and that this is known to Authority A. Authority A
then aims to maximise the social welfare of its own residents, given what Authority B has decided, through a counterpart
objective to (6).
In fact, even given the details of this speciﬁcation, there is still some ambiguity as to how we might deﬁne social welfare,
depending on our assumptions on the existence of any revenue-sharing agreements between the city authorities, which cor-
respond (using the terminology of the literature discussed in Section 1) to different assumptions on tax exporting behaviour.
In the simplest case, there is no tax exporting behaviour and all toll revenues (across both authorities) are returned to the
authority where the users who paid the tolls reside. That is to say, while the authorities decide their toll level individually, it
is as if they put the revenues in a central fund, and share them according to the origin of the users who paid the toll. This
concept of a central fund therefore mimics an element of the global regulator problem (6), and so might be expected to result
in solutions which are closer to the global regulator problem (than other alternatives we explore) in terms of tolls and aggre-
gate welfare. However, the case of individually-decided tolls with no tax export explicitly allows for full re-distribution of
revenues to those who paid the toll; in contrast, the global regulator, even if obtaining the same tolls and aggregate welfare,
would be free to distribute the revenues between the authorities via lump sum transactions in other proportions, so as to
balance any welfare changes on a per capita basis.
In the case of no tax exporting behaviour, the social welfare of Authority A is, under the assumptions above, given by:W0AðvðAÞ;vðBÞ;qðAÞ;qðBÞ; sAjsBÞ ¼
XjKj
k¼1
Z qðAÞ
k
0
gkðxÞdx h1 qðAÞ
 #
ln C exp hD# tðvðAÞ þ vðBÞÞ þ Ks   	 ðKsÞ#vðAÞ :The ﬁrst term in this objective function is the Marshallian measure of user beneﬁt, but in this case only with respect to
trips made from origins located within Authority A’s jurisdiction; note that by deﬁnition qðAÞk ¼ 0 if OD pair k corresponds to
an origin in Authority B, and so OD pairs for Authority B will make no contribution to the ﬁrst term’s summation over k. As
for the global regulator problem earlier, we then subtract the ‘user cost’ net of tolls, the difference being again that here we
restrict attention only to trips made by users with origins in Authority A. Thus, in the ﬁnal term, we must subtract the ele-
ment of the ‘price’ stimulus due to tolls imposed by either authority, but experienced only by Authority A travellers. Recall
that the q(A) vector in this second term has number of elements equal to number of OD pairs, but with elements equal to zero
for any OD pair originating in authority B; therefore the second term overall does not contain any contribution of costs/prices
experienced by Authority B residents. It is worth remarking a distinction with problem (6) is that we cannot now also give
the ﬁnal term an interpretation of revenue; in the notation given, the revenue to authority A from all ﬂows would be
K
sA
0

 
 #
ðvðAÞ þ vðBÞÞ and the revenue to authority A only from its own residents would be K sA0

 
 #
vðAÞ.
At the other extreme to no tax export, we may assume full tax exporting behaviour, which means that revenues collected
by Authority A (Authority B) remain within Authority A (Authority B), regardless of the originating authority of those who
paid the tolls. As a result, Authority A travellers paying Authority B’s toll will increase the social welfare of those in
Authority B—and therefore decrease the social welfare of those in Authority A—by the toll revenue paid. Conversely,
Authority B travellers paying Authority A’s toll increase the social welfare of those in Authority A by the toll revenue they
pay. This leads to two additional terms in the social welfare function of authority A, representing these two transfer
payments:
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XjKj
k¼1
Z qðAÞ
k
0
gkðxÞdx ðh1ðqðAÞÞ
#
ln C exp hD# tðvðAÞ þ vðBÞÞ þ Ks   	 ðKsÞ#vðAÞÞ
 K 0
sB

 
 #
vðAÞ þ K sA
0

 
 #
vðBÞ:We may unify these two extreme cases of tax exporting behaviour by introducing a scalar tax exporting parameter
a ð0 6 a 6 1Þ, which we assume to be common value for both authorities (though this is not a necessary restriction), which
leads after some slight simpliﬁcation to our analogous objective to (6):WAðvðAÞ;vðBÞ;qðAÞ;qðBÞ; sAjsBÞ ¼
XjKj
k¼1
Z qðAÞ
k
0
gkðxÞdx ðh1ðqðAÞÞ
#
lnfC expðhD#ðtðvðAÞ þ vðBÞÞ þ KsÞÞg  ðKsÞ#vðAÞÞ
 a K 0
sB

 
 #
vðAÞ þ a K sA
0

 
 #
vðBÞ:
ð11Þ
With a = 1 in (11) we have full tax exporting behaviour, whereas with a = 0 there is no tax exporting behaviour. Cases with
0 < a < 1 allow some partial degree of tax exporting behaviour.
Authority A is then supposed to solve an MPEC (12) that is a variant of (7), given the value of sB P 0:Maximise WAðvðAÞ;vðBÞ;qðAÞ;qðBÞ; sAjsBÞ
subject to ðv;qÞ 2 D
sA P 0
v ¼ vðAÞ þ vðBÞ q ¼ qðAÞ þ qðBÞ
v ¼ Dq pðD#ðtðvÞ þ KsÞ; hÞ
q ¼ dðh1 lnfC expðhD#ðtðvÞ þ KsÞgÞ:
ð12ÞSo far we have considered only authority A’s perspective as a decision-maker, but authority B is also making decisions in
the same way. Authority B thus aims to solve its own MPEC variant of (12) with a social welfare function of:WBðvðAÞ;vðBÞ;qðAÞ;qðBÞ; sBjsAÞ ¼
XjKj
k¼1
Z qðBÞ
k
0
gkðxÞdx ðh1ðqðBÞÞ
#
ln C expðhD#ðtðvðAÞ þ vðBÞÞ þ KsÞÞ 	 ðKsÞ#vðBÞÞ
 a K sA
0

 
 #
vðBÞ þ a K 0
sB

 
 #
vðAÞ
ð13Þ2.4. Formulation of Nash Equilibria between competing authorities
Finally, in the present section, based on the building blocks of the preceding sections, we set out our overall model of
competing authorities. As a ﬁrst step, we seek a similar simpliﬁcation to that obtained in the Global Regular case in the
transition from formulation (7)–(9). It transpires that in our SUE-based formulation, this is possible for general networks
without further assumptions required; this may be contrasted with the counterpart UE-based formulation, where additional
special restrictions are needed to deal with partial tax-exporting behaviour, which requires knowledge of authority-speciﬁc
ﬂows (Koh et al., 2012). This is a particularly attractive feature of the alternative, SUE-based model we present here.
LetXðAÞ be the |K|  |K| diagonal matrix which has diagonal entriesXðAÞkk ¼ 1 if ODmovement k has an origin in authority A,
and equal to zero otherwise. Clearly this matrix is deﬁnable a priori from the network structure. Suppose a counterpart
matrix XðBÞ is also deﬁned for authority B. Now suppose that (v⁄(s), q⁄(s)) is an elastic SUE solution as given by (8), for
given s. Then we may uniquely determine corresponding link ﬂows and demand ﬂows disaggregated by authority from:qðAÞðsÞ ¼ XðAÞqðsÞ vðAÞðsÞ ¼ DqðAÞðsÞpðD#ðtðvðsÞÞ þ KsÞ; hÞ
qðBÞðsÞ ¼ XðBÞqðsÞ vðBÞðsÞ ¼ DqðBÞðsÞpðD#ðtðvðsÞÞ þ KsÞ; hÞ: ð14ÞAgain, as in the Global Regulator case, the constraints to (12) deﬁne a unique allocation of link ﬂows and demands (in this
case disaggregated by authority). Clearly also since the disaggregated ﬂows are differentiable functions of the total link ﬂows
and demands, then since (v⁄(s), q⁄(s)) given by (8) is differentiable in s, then so is vðAÞðsÞ;vðBÞðsÞ;qðAÞðsÞ;qðBÞðsÞ  given by
the combination of (8) and (14). Thus we may obtain a smooth, single-level problem equivalent to (12) based on a com-
bination of the functions deﬁned in (8), (11) and (14):
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ð15ÞBased on a combination of the functions deﬁned in (8), (13) and (14), the corresponding problem that authority B aims to
solve may be expressed as:Maximise hBðsBjsAÞ ¼ WBðvðAÞðsÞ;vðBÞðsÞ;qðAÞðsÞ;qðBÞðsÞ; sBjsAÞ
subject to sB P 0
ð16ÞThe inter-play of the two authorities in each aiming to maximise its own welfare by setting a toll, conditional on the other
authority’s toll, while anticipating the impact on the travellers, leads us to an example of a so-called Equilibrium Problem
with Equilibrium Constraints (EPEC) (Mordukhovich, 2005). Based on problems (15) and (16) we may write this as:
Find s ¼ ðsA; sBÞ# P 0 such that simultaneously:
hAðsAjsBÞP hAðxjsBÞ 8xP 0
hBðsBjsAÞP hAðyjsAÞ 8yP 0 ð17Þ
m (17) assumes that the authorities can only determine their own toll conditional on the other authority, but places no
r restriction on the admissible tolls. That is to say, the conditions require that, as far as one authority is concerned, theirProble
furthe
toll gives (marginally, i.e. based only on optimising their own toll) a global optimum solution to their individual MPEC ((15)
or (16)), conditional on the other authority’s toll setting.
Taking the conditions for both authorities together, Eq. (17) deﬁnes a problem that we will henceforth simply refer to as a
Nash Equilibrium (NE) (Nash, 1950, 1951), in reference to the ‘game’ implicitly played between the two authorities.
However, we shall also be interested in Nash games that are variants of (17). Speciﬁcally, rather than each authority deter-
mining a global optimum toll conditional on the other authority’s toll choice, we consider the possibility that each authority
only determines a local optimum to their individual MPEC, requiring that the conditions (17) only hold within a local neigh-
bourhood of the given toll vector. Following Son and Baldick (2004), we shall refer to such a solution as a Local Nash
Equilibrium (LNE). Thus for an LNE, each authority only needs establish optimality within a neighbourhood of the given solu-
tion (see Son and Baldick, 2004 for such an example).
Since the LNE conditions are weaker, the solution set to the NE problem is contained within the solution set to the LNE.
Such LNE solutions are local stationary points of problems (15) and (16); noting the differentiability of problems (15) and
(16), such LNE points must simultaneously satisfy the ﬁrst-order KKT conditions of the two problems:sAh0AðsAjsBÞ ¼ sBh0BðsBjsAÞ ¼ 0
s ¼ ðsA; sBÞ# P 0
h0AðsAjsBÞP 0
h0BðsBjsAÞP 0
ð18Þwhere h0Að:jsBÞ and h0Bð:jsAÞ respectively denote the (partial) derivative functions of hA(|sB) and hB(|sA).
Expression (18) is in the form of a complementarity problem (Karamardian, 1972), which when stated in the generic form
of such problems may be written as:Find s 2 Rn such that :
s#h0ðsÞ ¼ 0
sP 0
h0ðsÞP 0
ð19Þwhere h0 : R2 ! R2 is given in (20):h0ðsÞ ¼ h
0
AðsAjsBÞ
h0BðsBjsAÞ
 !
ð20ÞIn the remainder of the paper, we will explore the determination of LNE solutions (i.e. the solution set to (19)/(20)), both
as solutions of interest in their own right, and as a means for determining NE solutions (i.e. solutions to (17)), the latter being
contained in the set of LNE solutions.
3. Solution algorithm for EPEC formulation
As discussed in Zhang (2010), there are two generic classes of methods for solving EPECs. The ﬁrst is the class of
Diagonalization Solution Methods (DSM). These include the Gauss–Jacobi and Gauss–Seidel methods that have been pro-
posed in Harker (1984). The other category may be referred to as Simultaneous Solution Methods (SSM). While a DSM solves
each MPEC individually until the entire system converges, an SSM method aims to solve the entire system of interrelated
MPECs simultaneously. In this context, this paper proposes an algorithm based on solving a sequence of Linear
Complementarity Problems (LCPs), which takes advantage of the problem formulation as given in (20). We thus tailor the
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an example of an SSM.
Kolstad and Mathiesen (1991) proposed to solve the complementarity problem presented in (18) by linearising the func-
tion h0(s) at some starting point and this results in a linear complementarity problem (LCP). This LCP can be solved by appli-
cation of Lemke’s algorithm and the function h0(s) is re-linearised at this solution and the process is repeated until
convergence is achieved. Such an algorithm has been successfully applied to several kinds of problem in the transportation
ﬁeld (Friesz et al., 1983; Harker and Friesz, 1985; Ribeiroa and Simõesa, 2015).
Speciﬁcally, the linearisation of h0(s0) at some arbitrary starting vector of tolls s0 using a ﬁrst order Taylor expansion,
results in expression (21), with rh(s0) being the 2  2 Jacobian matrix of h0(s), evaluated at s = s0:Lðsjs0Þ ¼ h0ðs0Þ þ rh0ðs0Þðs s0Þ: ð21Þ
Expression (21) allows us to formulate a linearised counterpart of the complementarity problem in (19) obtaining thus an
LCP (see Cottle et al., 2009) of the form deﬁned in (22):Find s 2 R2 such that :
Lðsjs0Þ ¼ zþMsP 0
sP 0
s#Lðs=s0Þ ¼ 0
9>=
>;LCPðM; zÞ ð22Þwhere z = h0(s0) rh0(s0)s0 and M =rh0(s0)
Our Sequential LCP (SLCP) algorithm, adapted from Kolstad and Mathiesen (1991) then operates as follows:
Sequential Linear Complementarity Problem (SLCP) AlgorithmStep 0: Choose some starting vector of tolls s0. Select a small positive convergence tolerance, e (e > 0). Set counter j = 0
and go to Step 1Step 1: Solve the logit trafﬁc assignment problem (8) with sjStep 2: Obtain derivatives: h0(sj) and rh0(sj) and thus compute z and M
Step 3: Solve LCP(M, z) in (22)
Step 4: Check convergence: If max h0(sj) < e, terminate else set j = j + 1 and go to Step 1Thus at each iteration from an initial starting vector of tolls, the proposed algorithm iterates between solving an elastic
demand SUE trafﬁc assignment problem, in which the required derivative information is also computed, and the solution of a
LCP, until convergence is attained. In terms of numerical implementation, we have found that sufﬁcient accuracy is obtained
regardless of whether the required derivatives are computed by a ﬁne-level ﬁnite differencing or by analytical approaches
(for the latter see, for example, Bell and Iida, 1997; Ying and Miyagi, 2001; Ying and Yang, 2005), though the latter is more
computationally efﬁcient. In our implementation, the LCP sub-problem in Step 3 was solved using PATH, a solver for com-
plementarity problems (Ferris and Munson, 2000).
We remark that in addition to SLCP, alternative approaches based on minimising the Nikaido–Isoda function (Nikaidô
and Isoda, 1955) have also been proposed for single level Nash games, e.g. Krawczyk and Uryasev (2000). Furthermore,
since a Nash game can be posed (as we have shown) as a variational inequality problem, projection methods (see Tinti,
2005 for a review) are also applicable in this context. While testing such alternative methods is an interesting area for
future research, in the present paper we restrict attention to the application of the SLCP algorithm. We used this
method to generate the set of LNE solutions by specifying a grid of starting conditions (for the toll levels), and solving
the SLCP for each.
4. Numerical examples
In this section we present two numerical examples. The ﬁrst builds on an example previously reported in the literature in
this context, but assuming a UE rather than SUE response of travellers. The second is an example adapted from Zhang et al.
(2011) and provides results for a larger grid network.
In each example, the link travel time functions are assumed to follow the separable BPR form as shown in Eq. (23):tlðvÞ ¼ t0l 1þ 0:15
v l
Cl

 
 4
ðl 2 LÞ: ð23ÞRegarding the demand function, while there are many choices of function that satisfy the conditions stated earlier,
which ensure uniqueness of elastic demand SUE solutions (Cantarella, 1997), we wished to make comparisons with earlier
work in which a DUE assumption was made with unbounded demand functions (Koh et al., 2012), of the power law form
shown in Eq. (24):
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sk
s0k

 g
ðk ¼ 1;2; . . . ; jKjÞ ð24Þwhere the pair (q0k ; s
0
k) are the base demands and composite generalised time in a reference case (in our case, with no tolls),
g < 0 is the elasticity of demand (set in our tests as g = 0.58 for all OD pairs). In order to achieve such a goal, while main-
taining our original stated assumption, the function in (24) was slightly modiﬁed, such that for any value of satisfaction less
than some very small number e > 0, the demand is linear in the satisfaction and differentiable at the break-point:dkðskÞ ¼
q0k
e
s0k

 g
1þ g
e
ðsk  eÞ
 
for 0 6 sk 6 e
q0k
sk
s0
k

 g
for sk > e
8>><
>>:
ðk 2 KÞ:In addition, we should note that it is possible—with very low values of the logit dispersion parameter h—for the satisfac-
tion to become negative, and in such cases the speciﬁcation of the elastic demand function makes little sense. Such cases are
excluded from our analysis, as we believe them to beyond an allowable sensible range for h. Thus, across all tests for the
range of h values we consider, the minimum satisfaction for any OD movement is zero, and from the demand function speci-
ﬁcation above, it can be seen that dkð0Þ ¼ q0k
e
s0k

 g
ð1 gÞ, i.e. there is a ﬁnite positive upper bound. In practice, by restricting
the admissible h values as above, we were able to choose such a small value of e that no equilibrium fell on the linear section
of the demand function, so that effectively our solutions coincide with using (24), except that we retain the theoretical con-
dition of a bounded demand function.
In the following, subsections 4.1–4.3 focus on a small example previously studied in the literature in a similar context, but
assuming a DUE rather than SUE model of traveller behaviour. Throughout subsections 4.1–4.5, it is assumed that there is full
tax exporting (i.e. a = 1). In this example, we explore the existence, multiplicity and computation of LNE and NE solutions,
while varying the assumptions about traveller sensitivity/mis-perception. We investigate the robustness of the proposed
SLCP algorithm for determining LNE under varying values of the dispersion parameter h. In doing so we consider whether
there exist multiple LNE and if so, whether the number of LNE varies with h. We compare the LNE and NE solutions to
the SUE-based global regulator solution.
Subsections 4.4–4.6 focus on a second, larger example, adapted from an example found in the literature. Beyond applying
the SLCP algorithm to identify NE solutions, we investigate the inﬂuence of varying the tax exporting parameter a, and dis-
cuss its policy implications.
4.1. Example 1: Exploration of Nash Equilibria as the dispersion parameter (h) is varied
The network used in Example 1 is taken from Koh et al. (2012), where full details of all parameters and functions can be
found (see Fig. 1).
A cordon is a toll pricing scheme where ‘‘vehicles pay a toll to cross a cordon in the inbound direction, in the outbound
direction, or possibly in both directions’’ (de Palma and Lindsey, 2011, p. 1381). This can be simulated in this model by
assuming that Authority A sets a uniform common toll on Links 1 and 6, thus forming a cordon around its CBD zone 2, while
Authority B sets a uniform common toll on Links 7 and 12 forming a cordon around its CBD zone 4. This sets the context of
the game considered in where each city uses its cordon toll to maximise the welfare of its own residents according to (14)
and (16).
Our previous research reported in Koh et al. (2012), demonstrated the existence of 4 LNE for this network in the UE case.
In this section, we show that multiple LNE continue to exist under SUE for large h (small dispersion), but as h decreases and
we move further from UE then only one LNE solution exists, which also satisﬁes the NE conditions (and so is the unique NE
solution).
In order to explore the existence of LNE solutions for a given h value, we evaluated the welfare for each authority for a
given toll pair with tolls ranging between 0 and 1000 s. Given that we have only two uniform tolls in our example then it
is possible to visualise the welfare surfaces and to estimate the gradient of an authority’s welfare with respect to that author-
ity’s own toll at each point, given the other authority’s toll. Now, we note that the LNE necessary conditions (18) for any s > 0
are equivalent to requiring h0AðsAjsBÞ ¼ h0BðsBjsAÞ ¼ 0. Therefore to explore the location of the LNE solutions (i.e. solutions
which both satisfy the LNE necessary ﬁrst order conditions (18) and are a local maximum), a sensible strategy for such inter-
ior points is to produce ‘best response function’ plots for each authority and to identify toll combinations where these func-
tions intersect. The best response function for authority A, for example, given authority B’s toll sB, is a sA where (a) the
gradient h0AðsAjsBÞ ¼ 0, and (b) the point is a local maximum with respect to sA. Note that any remaining cases, where
one or other toll is equal to zero, can be separately veriﬁed and excluded from consideration.
Examples of such best response function plots for the cases h = 0.005 and h = 0.5 are shown in the left and right panes of
Fig. 2. Where the best response functions are near horizontal or vertical, this is indicative of a low level of interaction
between the two problems solved by the authorities. This is an artefact of the network and demand scenario selected in this
example; this will not always be the case, as will be seen in Example 2. With h = 0.005 there is only one point of intersection,
Fig. 1. Network used in Example 1, the numbers indicated are link numbers referred to in the text and direction of travel is indicated by the arrows. The
dotted line that splits node 3 demarcates the limits of jurisdiction of each authority.
Fig. 2. Best response functions for h = 0.005 (left pane) and h = 0.5 (right pane).
D.P. Watling et al. / Transportation Research Part B 76 (2015) 93–116 105which demonstrates there is only one LNE solution, and hence only one NE solution, at a toll of around 300 s set by each
authority. With h = 0.5 there are four points of intersection, therefore four LNE solutions, and it can be veriﬁed (by simply
checking the welfare levels at LNE solutions) that there is one NE solution, which is the one marked ‘Solution 3’ in Fig. 2.
4.2. Example 1: Solution by SLCP algorithm
The analysis in Section 4.2 required exhaustively computing a great many SUE solutions over a discrete grid of toll values.
This would be computationally prohibitive for larger networks, and does not allowmore reﬁned estimates of the solutions to
be obtained than the discretisation assumed. However, it gives a good reference point for testing the SLCP algorithm
described in Section 3, which we propose as an efﬁcient method for larger scale networks. Under the formulation given, this
algorithm seeks solutions that satisfy necessary conditions for LNE, i.e. it aims to ﬁnd potential LNE solutions, from which we
can then test (by a small perturbation of tolls): does the solution satisfy the LNE conditions? By varying the starting condi-
tions of the algorithm, we may then aim to ﬁnd multiple potential LNE; of those that are LNE solutions, we may then test the
satisfaction of the NE conditions (17) within this (typically small) set of LNE solutions. This raises several practical issues to
test for the algorithm: Do the solutions it generates always satisfy the LNE conditions, or do we ﬁnd other solutions emerg-
ing? By varying the initial conditions, do we get different LNE in cases where we know multiple LNE exist? How much effort
(in terms of different initial conditions) might we have to expend to generate all the LNE?
As noted previously, the number of LNE solutions in this network depends on h. Table 1 presents all LNE solutions iden-
tiﬁed in our experiments (from applying SLCP across a grid of starting conditions), for a range of h values. As can be seen from
the table, multiple LNE were seen to exist for hP 0.02, and in all other cases only a single LNE was found which is also the
unique NE solution. Alongside the LNE solutions, we report in Table 1 the welfare change relative to an assumed base-case
where neither authority tolls. While this base-case itself depends on h, for any given h the welfare of the base no-toll solution
is clearly a constant, and so it is immaterial whether we assume the authorities are aiming to maximise absolute welfare or
welfare change; the advantage in reporting the welfare change is that we feel it is a more sensible way to make comparisons
over the h values. For any of the LNE solutions it can be seen that the welfare change improves as h increases; with lower
sensitivity to travel costs (larger h), more users choose the shorter town centre routes where they face a toll.
Table 1
Tolls (seconds) and Welfare Change by Authority (seconds) for LNE solutions, with NE solutions indicated by shaded cells.
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Table 2
Percentage of runs with alternative starting points out of 10,201 terminating at each LNE solution.
h LNE Solution 1 (%) LNE Solution 2 (%) LNE Solution 3 (%) LNE Solution 4 (%)
0.02 27.36 24.70 23.08 24.86
0.05 0.54 6.62 86.31 6.54
0.5 0.08 2.33 94.61 2.98
1 0.02 0.69 98.30 0.99
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exploring the change in welfare for each authority when the other authority’s toll was ﬁxed at that LNE solution value
(i.e. seeking a global optimum for that authority, conditional on the other’s toll). In all cases a single NE was identiﬁed to
exist, and this is indicated by the shading in Table 1. Clearly there is a signiﬁcant change in the NE solution depending on
h. For hP 0.02 the NE solution leads to both authorities charging a high toll, approaching (as may be anticipated) the NE
solution found under deterministic travel behaviour. For h 6 0.01, on the other hand, the unique LNE/NE solution has both
authorities charging a moderate toll. In all cases, the NE solutions give negative welfare changes; in spite of each authority
aiming to maximise their own welfare, the competition between them leads in this case to overall disbeneﬁts to both their
own residents and to society as a whole.
In order to understand this apparent ‘‘paradox’’ of overall welfare disbeneﬁts of welfare-maximising authorities, it is
important to ﬁrst remark that in no case was s = 0 (neither authority tolls) found to be an LNE solution, although it is per-
mitted. This implies that there must be some initial incentive for each authority to toll a non-zero amount. Exploring author-
ity A’s welfare as a function of sA, given a zero or very low authority B toll (say, 0 6 sB 6 50Þ (plot not shown here due to
space limitations), positive welfare gains can certainly be obtained by authority A charging a very low toll (again, much
lower than in any of the LNE solutions). This is borne out by the global regulator solutions, as discussed later
(Section 4.4), which also have authorities charging somemuch lower toll than in any of the LNE solutions. Even at such lower
tolls, there is an incentive (in the competing cities formulation) for cities to continue raising their toll levels. This may seem
surprising, especially given the observation made earlier (Section 4.2) that in the network of Example 1 there is relative weak
network interactions between the cities. In this case, the effect can be traced to be almost entirely attributable to the tax-
exporting assumption; recall that with a = 1 each authority’s objective functions include two tax-export terms, which trade
off the welfare loss from tolls paid by its citizens to the other authority with the welfare gain of tolls paid in its own network
by the other authority’s citizens. This means that any incentive for Authority B to increase its toll leads, ceteris paribus, to an
indirect welfare loss to Authority A, for which Authority A then has the incentive to compensate through raising its own toll.
From Table 1, there are two kinds of LNE solutions, symmetric (equal toll) and asymmetric. In the asymmetric solutions,
the highest welfare improvement (or, in some cases, least bad deterioration in welfare) is obtained for a city charging the
higher toll, for all h values. In all cases where multiple LNE exist, the total welfare change (given by the sum of Welfare
Change in A andWelfare Change in B) for Solutions 2 and 4 is lower than that for Solution 1, while all three of these solutions
are preferable to the NE (Solution 3) on total welfare grounds.
In terms of numerical implementation, a question of particular interest is: how does the SLCP algorithm perform, either in
determining all LNE solutions or in locating the NE solution? In order to understand this, we generated a grid of initial con-
ditions between 0 and 1000 s in steps of 10 for each authority thereby generating 10,201 distinct start points for the SLCP
algorithm. Table 2 shows that when h = 0.02, the solutions found by SLCP were almost distributed evenly among each of the
four LNE solutions. If we randomly chose the initial conditions we would in this case have almost equal probability of locat-
ing each of the LNE solutions. However for the case of h = 1, 98% of the solutions converged to Solution 3 (the NE solution),
while Solution 1 was found in 0.02% of these cases. The performance of the algorithm in this respect is therefore rather sen-
sitive to the value of h.
To understand why this is the case, we examined welfare change for each authority as a function of that authority’s toll,
given that the other authority is tolling at an LNE solution. For illustration, and since of course it is of particular interest, we
show the graphs in the neighbourhood of the NE solution; welfare changes for Authority A, assuming that Authority B sets
the NE toll, are plotted in Figs. 3a–3d. These ﬁgures show how changes in the logit dispersion parameter h change the shape
of the welfare function. When h = 0.5 (Fig. 3a), the welfare function has multiple local optima,2 but conﬁrms that the NE solu-
tion for Authority A is indeed a global optimum, conditional on Authority B’s toll. (The same graphs, but conditioned on
Authority B tolling at one of the other LNE solutions, are not shown due to space limitations, but look very similar to these ﬁg-
ures, and provide conﬁrmation that the other mode of the function is indeed a local but not global optimum.) On the other hand,
the global optimum of the welfare function corresponding to the NE solution is less obvious when h = 0.02 (Fig. 3b). It is clear2 In the toll range 0–100 s, non-captive users begin to move from the tolled routes to the bypass routes. For higher values of h the route choice is more
sensitive to costs and for tolls over 100 s practically no non-captive users take the tolled routes, and so the welfare curve for those particular OD pairs peaks for
a toll less than 100 s. For the captive users, their welfare curves peak for tolls above 100 s as they have no alternate route choice. Finally we have the net change
in revenue effect which tends to increase the optimal toll. The net effect of summing welfare over all OD pairs and accounting for revenue exportation results in
multiple local optima. As h is decreased, then the route choice is less sensitive and some non-captive users remain on tolled routes for higher tolls. This has the
effect of ﬂattening the welfare curve for these OD pairs and as h is decreased further then the ﬁrst local maximum is eventually smoothed out.
Fig. 3a. Welfare Change for Authority A as toll varies (h = 0.5) assuming Authority B sets the NE toll of 504.0.
Fig. 3b. Welfare Change for Authority A as toll varies (h = 0.02) assuming Authority B sets the NE toll of 497.6.
Fig. 3c. Welfare Change for Authority A as toll varies (h = 0.01) assuming Authority B sets the NE toll of 221.7.
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Fig. 3d. Welfare Change for Authority A as toll varies (h = 0.005) assuming Authority B sets the NE toll of 295.4.
D.P. Watling et al. / Transportation Research Part B 76 (2015) 93–116 109then that while SUE smooths the problem, it also makes the local optima of the welfare function less distinct and not easily
distinguishable from the global optima. Thus the basin of attraction around the local optimum is larger with a lower h, which
implies that SLCP is not easily able to distinguish between these two solutions. Furthermore Figs. 3c and 3d show that as h is
further reduced, the welfare plots also begin to display a single local optimumwhich corresponds to the case where there is only
one LNE and one NE.4.3. Example 1: Comparison of LNE solutions with global regulator solution
As noted in Section 4.3, there exist LNE solutions across a range of h values where both authorities set positive tolls that
cause a reduction in welfare relative to an untolled base equilibrium. We refer to this as the Prisoner’s Dilemma outcome
because it reﬂects the paradox that, in equilibrium, both players are in fact worse off than if neither had tolled at all, the
situation arising as a result of being incentivized to take an action by the other authority’s toll decision. To avoid such a case,
it may be necessary to regulate the tolls whereby a regulator aims to maximise global welfare. In this setting, a single reg-
ulator rather than the individual cities determines both cordon tolls with the aim of maximising total welfare. Due to the
symmetry of our example, the tolls and welfare for each city will in the global regulator case be identical and each city
obtains welfare equal to half the global welfare. To aid the discussion, we also include the maximum possible welfare obtain-
able from ﬁrst-best pricing where all links may be tolled and include the x index following Verhoef et al. (1996) which is the
ratio of second-best welfare improvement over the ﬁrst-best welfare improvement or relative efﬁciency measure.
Table 3 shows the solution of the Global Regulator Problem and First Best Problem. Comparing Table 1 with Table 3, it is
evident that the total welfare (i.e. sum of Welfare A and Welfare B) at LNE Solution 1 moves further away from the global
regulator solution as h is decreased (users becoming less cost sensitive). As h decreases, the tolls charged in the LNE Solution
1 become higher (and are always higher than the global regulator tolls) and total welfare decreases. In LNE Solutions 2 and 4,
then for higher values of h one authority tolls a low toll that is not so far from the global regulator toll, but this authority has
overall disbeneﬁts due to the high toll imposed by the other authority. In solution 3, which happens to be the only NE solu-
tion, both authorities charge a much higher toll than the global regulator solution, and both end up with signiﬁcant disbene-
ﬁts. For the cases where there is only one LNE/NE (h 6 0.01), there is no solution for the Nash game which is ‘‘close’’ to the
global regulator solution. This suggests that as dispersion increases (i.e. a smaller h) then under competition there is no
possibility of achieving a positive welfare outcome relative to the untolled base equilibrium for a given h, and a regulatorTable 3
Tolls (seconds) and total welfare change (seconds) for global regulator problem and ﬁrst best problem.
h Global regulator solution First best solution x (=DW1/DW2)
sA sB Welfare change (DW1) Welfare change (DW2)
0.005 61.2 61.2 9835 11,647 0.84
0.007 60.1 60.1 10,556 12,689 0.83
0.009 59.3 59.3 11,333 13,784 0.82
0.01 59.2 59.2 11,740 14,331 0.82
0.02 58.8 58.8 15,522 19,227 0.81
0.03 60.1 60.1 18,441 22,626 0.82
0.04 61.9 61.9 20,404 24,645 0.83
0.5 79.0 79.0 21,114 22,268 0.95
1 79.0 79.0 20,705 21,868 0.95
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their route choice and decision to travel, competition between cities would result in greater dis-beneﬁts for both cities, with
higher tolls imposed on the users.
For the higher h value cases, LNE Solution 1 is seen to be closer to the regulator solution, and so there may be a greater
chance that authorities in such a case would accept regulation and LNE Solution 1, if they were only adopting conservative/
local optimising behaviour. As the gap between the global regulator solution and LNE Solution 1 increases with a decrease in
h, then there would be a greater need for regulation of the authorities. It is also of interest to note that as h decreases even
further, that the extent of welfare gain possible even under the globally regulated case decreases. This may suggest that if
users are less cost-sensitive, then there may be less beneﬁt to be gained from road pricing in general.
Regarding the ﬁrst-best outcome (shown for comparison purposes in Table 3), as with the regulated case as h decreases
the absolute welfare improvement increases initially and then decreases with lower values of h. This is due to the interaction
between the terms in the welfare function, some of which increase with decreases in h directly while others are dependent
on the resulting demand, route ﬂows and optimal toll which are dependent on h indirectly. It should be noted that while the
welfare gain from ﬁrst best may increase initially, the gain is compared to a h-dependent reference (no-toll equilibrium)
which itself has a lower welfare outcome due to the users being less sensitive to cost. Our explanation is that as users
become less cost-sensitive then route choices are more difﬁcult to ‘‘correct’’ via tolling and the demand related terms in
the welfare function become more dominant. Such ﬁndings may, however, be network-speciﬁc (backed up by the different
pattern we shall discuss in our second example), so care should be taken in generalising these ﬁndings.4.4. Example 2: Exploration of Local Nash Equilibria as dispersion parameter (h) varied
Fig. 4 shows our second example, a grid network adapted from Zhang et al. (2011).
This network comprises 62 links and 20 nodes. The network parameters remain unchanged from that reported in Zhang
et al. (2011) and each link adopts the BPR function of the form shown in Eq. (23).
Horizontal links have free ﬂow travel time, t0l , of 2.5 min with capacity, Cl, of 700 vehicles per hour while vertical links
have free ﬂow travel time of 5 min with capacity of 1000 vehicles per hour.
On the demand side, a matrix is adopted that differs from that used in Zhang et al. (2011). This is because while the
authors also studied toll revenue competition between two adjacent authorities, their setting assumed that Authority A
was a residential suburb while Authority B was the employment zone. Furthermore, they did not consider cordon pricing
as we do. In our example, the matrix comprising 56 OD pairs is shown in Table 4 and the demand function used was the
power law form as shown in Eq. (24).
Note that only the diagonals of the OD matrix are zero (i.e. intrazonal trips were excluded from consideration), and that
the base trip matrix is assumed to be entirely symmetric.
Authority A is interested in the welfare of residents in its jurisdiction (Zones 1, 7, 12 and 16) while Authority B is inter-
ested in the welfare of residents in its jurisdiction (Zones 5, 9, 14 and 20). The predeﬁned cordon of Authority A is intended to
toll trafﬁc entering Zones 7 and 12 and a common toll is levied on the 6 links numbered: 9, 12, 17, 20, 36 and 55. On the other
hand, Authority B’s predeﬁned cordon are links inbound into zones 9 and 14, namely links numbered 13, 16, 21, 24, 40 and
59. These cordon links are shown by the thicker lines in Fig. 4.Fig. 4. Network with 20 nodes and 62 links from Zhang et al. (2011). Rectangular nodes represent origins and destinations while circular nodes only serve
to connect links in the network. The dotted line demarcates the separation of jurisdiction between authorities. The thicker lines represent the closed cordon
in each jurisdiction.
Table 4
Modiﬁed base trip matrix for example 2.
1 5 7 9 12 14 16 20
Suburb A: Zone 1 0 200 1000 500 1000 500 200 200
Suburb B: Zone 5 200 0 500 1000 500 1000 200 200
CBD A: Zone 7 200 200 0 200 100 200 200 200
CBD B: Zone 9 200 200 200 0 200 100 200 200
CBD A: Zone 12 200 200 100 200 0 200 200 200
CBD B: Zone 14 200 200 200 100 200 0 200 200
Suburb A: Zone 16 200 200 1000 500 1000 500 0 200
Suburb B: Zone 20 200 200 500 1000 500 1000 200 0
Table 5
Tolls (min) and welfare change (min) for global regulator problem and ﬁrst best problem.
h Global regulator solution First best solution x (=DW1/DW2)
sA sB Welfare change (DW1) Welfare Change A Welfare Change B Welfare change (DW2)
0.2 16.81 16.81 102,849 51,431 51,417 175,265 0.59
0.4 28.33 28.33 75,080 37,534 37,546 137,454 0.55
0.6 28.05 28.05 73,720 36,857 36,863 130,093 0.57
0.8 28.25 28.25 73,376 36,688 36,688 127,266 0.58
1 28.18 28.18 73,237 36,619 36,619 125,722 0.58
10 28.26 28.26 72,197 36,099 36,099 120,557 0.60
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lem leads to equal toll levels for both jurisdictions; the results for this case are shown in Table 5.
First of all, it is noticeable that the optimal tolls are much higher in this example than in Example 1, despite using the
same demand elasticity, similar free ﬂow travel times and the same BPR function. To understand this, it is helpful to dis-
tinguish between captive trips and non-captive trips. Captive trips are those that have destinations within the tolled zones
(i.e. CBDs of either authority) and are therefore captive to any cordon toll introduced. On the other hand, an example of a
non-captive trip is the movement from Zone 16 to Zone 5; such trips are distinguished by the fact that they have a choice
of avoiding the tolled links. Prior to the introduction of any toll, in the untolled base equilibrium for h = 10, around 120
(out of 200) trips from this particular OD pair utilise a route using one or more of the tollable links. With the introduction
of the toll, these trips are suppressed as the toll is increased. This effect is also present in Example 1, however in the net-
work of Example 2 the captive and non-captive trips share untolled entry links. This means that in Example 2, as the cap-
tive trips are suppressed, the non-captive trips beneﬁt substantially from congestion relief. This effect does not occur in
Example 1 where the introduction of a toll causes non-captive trips to re-route around the longer bypass, and as the toll
increases more trips are routed around the bypass so that the cost of travel for non-captive trips is always increasing with
tolls.
In the current example, non-captive trips experience a reduction in costs due to the structure of the network as the toll is
increased; as we employ elastic demand, the number of these non-captive trips increases compared to the no toll case. These
increases in non-captive trips, along with the decongestion beneﬁts, then counter the suppression of the captive trips and so
a greater welfare gain is possible with a much higher toll. Note that even with lower demands than the modiﬁed matrix that
we have used and with different tollable links, Zhang et al. (2011) reported tolls of a similar order of magnitude (between 9
and 30 min) in their equivalent of our global regulator problem.
A second noticeable feature of Table 5 is that the toll level is much lower when h = 0.2 being 16 min versus a value
around 28 min for higher h values. In general, as h decreases users are less sensitive to costs, and so for any given toll
level, the suppression achieved is lower with a lower h. At the same time, this means that the ‘indirect generation’ effect
caused by the freeing up of untolled entry links will also be lower. In addition to the demand effect, there is a notice-
able change in use of paths for certain OD pairs as users become less cost sensitive, and more dispersed across the
available routes. This dispersion of trafﬁc across paths combined with a lesser demand response impacts on different
elements of the local welfare function, so that a relatively lower toll becomes optimal as h is varied. On the contrary,
with a higher h, because users are then more sensitive to costs, more captive OD pairs are suppressed for a given toll
level. This also implies that there is more freeing up of shared entry links. Essentially, the trade-off between beneﬁts
arising to different OD pairs within the welfare function varies as the demand and route choices vary with changes
in cost sensitivity.
This different network structure also gives rise to a different pattern in ﬁrst best welfare gains compared to Example 1.
Here as sensitivity to cost is reduced, the potential beneﬁt from ﬁrst best tolling increases as h decreases for all values tested.
The beneﬁt from the global regulator case also follows this pattern with the relative efﬁciency of the regulated case remain-
ing between 0.55 and 0.6.
Fig. 5. (Left pane) Welfare Change for Authority A as toll varies (h = 0.4) assuming Authority B sets the NE toll of 66.27 (right pane) Welfare Change for
Authority A as toll varies (h = 10) assuming Authority B sets the NE toll of 69.89.
Table 6
Total and jurisdictional welfare change with interjurisdictional competition.
h sA sB Welfare Change A Welfare Change B Total welfare change x
0.2 65.52 65.52 10,590 10,561 21,151 0.12
0.4 66.27 66.27 4678 4677 9355 0.07
0.6 67.31 67.31 3306 3306 6613 0.05
0.8 68.03 68.03 2641 2641 5281 0.04
1 68.47 68.47 2270 2270 4540 0.04
10 69.89 69.89 1125 1125 2250 0.02
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In Example 2, the SLCP algorithm was again applied across a grid of starting conditions, in order to estimate potential LNE
solutions, and this was repeated for a range of h values. For each given h tested, only a single LNE was found, which was
indeed veriﬁed to satisfy the NE conditions. We believe that the existence of a single LNE can be explained by the common
entry link for the captive and non-captive trips. As discussed above, when a toll is charged on the cordon, the non-captive
trips actually beneﬁt from decongestion and the welfare is increasing as the non-captive trips are tolled off the CBD routes.
This is in contrast to Example 1, where non-captive trips see an increase in travel costs as they are tolled away from the CBD
routes, which was seen to lead to an LNE at lower toll levels. Since with Example 2 we need not make the distinction in our
discussion between LNE and NE solutions, we shall henceforth refer to the solutions obtained as NE solutions.
The left and right panes of Fig. 5 illustrate how the welfare for Authority A changes as its own toll varies for h = 0.4 and
h = 10 respectively, if Authority B sets a toll at the NE solution, so that we see the incentive to charge alone around the NE
solution. As the network is symmetric, a plot of B’s welfare will display a similar pattern for a ﬁxed value of Authority A’s toll.
We did not ﬁnd any case of a ‘double-peaked’ welfare as we discussed with Example 1.
Table 6 gives the resulting NE toll levels and jurisdictional welfare change (measured relative to the untolled base equi-
librium for a given h) obtained by the SLCP algorithm with a convergence tolerance of s#h0(s) < 0.01. Due to the symmetry of
the example, we expect the tolls to be the same for the two authorities, and the ﬁnal welfare functions; the differences seen
are purely convergence error.
As an example to verify that the solutions are indeed NE solutions, Fig. 6 shows the best response functions for both
authorities for the case of h = 1 (left panel) and h = 10 (right panel). In this ﬁgure, the best response function for Authority
A to any toll level of Authority B is indicated by the continuous line. Similarly the best response function for Authority B
to any toll level of Authority A is indicated by the broken lines. As the NE is the intersection of these best response functions,
these ﬁgures numerically verify that the solution reported in Table 6 (indicated on these ﬁgures by a large asterisk) coincides
with the intersection of these best response functions.
Comparing Tables 5 and 6, we see that the tolls under the NE solution are higher (under competition) than when a global
regulator is in place. This is due to the desire of each jurisdiction to extract toll revenues from users from outside the juris-
diction, a result consistent with the previous network example. This shows that—at each dispersion parameter H value
tested—the higher toll under inter-jurisdictional competition vis-à-vis the global regulator toll arises as a result of a com-
bination of both the over-internalisation of externalities, as well as revenue maximising behaviour of each jurisdiction.
Fig. 6. (Left pane): Intersection of best response functions for h = 1 coincides with the cordon toll obtained by SLCP, of 68.47 min for both Authority A and B.
(Right pane): Intersection of best response functions for h = 10 coincides with the cordon toll obtained by SLCP, of 69.89 min for both Authority A and B.
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into account the toll set by the other authority when deciding its toll level in the game. This reﬂects research ﬁndings from
the private operator literature (van den Berg, 2013). On the latter (revenue maximising) issue, this arises since extra-juris-
dictional users who travel on a jurisdiction’s road network contribute only to the toll revenue element of each player’s objec-
tive function. Such a ﬁnding is consistent with those reported in Zhang et al. (2011). While the exact form of our (non-linear)
demand function is likely to inﬂuence this result, we already know that such a phenomenon can occur even under linear
demand functions (De Borger et al., 2007; Ubbels and Verhoef, 2008). In particular, Ubbels and Verhoef show that welfare
under uncooperative tolling may be signiﬁcantly lower than for ﬁrst-best tolling in the case of linear demand functions.
In their restricted setting, the ﬁrst-best is the same as what we refer to as the global regulator problem (see Eq. (6)) and their
model is a special case of ours where there is no route choice. Therefore, from this example we can say that it is possible that
the welfare under non-cooperative tolling is signiﬁcantly lower than under cooperative (global regulator) tolls, and that the
tolls may also be relatively higher, even with a linear demand function.
We would also note that in our experiments, the welfare change under competition (relative to an untolled base equi-
librium) is positive, and again we have a kind of Prisoner’s Dilemma, i.e. players are worse off than under a co-operative solu-
tion. This is because each authority is still incentivised to begin the game (positive welfare compared with neither doing
anything) but both end up worse off doing so, because the welfare gain is lower than that which would be possible under
global regulation. In this case, competitive tolling is not worse than no tolling at all, but is worse than global regulation, only
achieving between 0.02 and 0.12 of the relevant ﬁrst best welfare gain. This does not compare favourably with the global
regulator tolls which achieved relative efﬁciencies of between 0.55 and 0.6 of the welfare gain under ﬁrst-best tolling.
4.6. Example 2: NE as tax exporting parameter (a) varies
In all cases presented in subsections 4.1–4.5 we restricted attention to results for the case a = 1 (full tax exporting). We
have tested both Examples for other values of a, and found qualitatively similar results in terms of algorithm convergence,
existence and multiplicity of LNE/NE solutions, and impact of the dispersion parameter h. On the other hand, some interest-
ing policy impacts arise, and so in the present section, we analyse the effect of how changes in the tax exporting parameter a
affects the NE toll levels, and offer some analysis of why this is the case.
The results we present relate to Example 2; again a single LNE/NE solution was found by the SLCP algorithm for all values
of a and h tested, regardless of the starting point of the algorithm, as so it is appropriate to refer to ‘‘the NE solution’’. Table 7
shows the NE tolls as the tax exporting parameter a is varied for three representative values of dispersion parameter h. Fig. 7
shows the same NE tolls graphically.
To understand the results, let us ﬁrst consider the two extreme points of a = 0 (no tax exporting) and a = 1 (full tax
exporting). Firstly, the NE tolls when a = 0 can be seen to be less than the tolls from the corresponding global regulator case;
this can be seen by comparing each h for a = 0 with the corresponding case in Table 5. This is the case because in the NE
solution, the welfare function (15) and (16) used by each authority does not take into account the full network-wide welfare
effects, but only the congestion effect on its own residents. Secondly, in comparison with other values of a, under the full tax
exporting regime, we may expect the highest tolls as the authority retains all revenues from the other authority’s residents.
Given these two points, it would then be expected that as a moves from 0 towards 1 that the NE tolls should increase. An
increase in a increases the revenue retained by the authority, and in the extreme case of full tax exporting, the tolls are high-
est. The results in Table 6 conﬁrm this expected phenomenon, and furthermore we can see that this continues to hold for
each of the h values tested.
Table 7
NE tolls and total welfare change (mins) as tax exporting parameter a changes.
a Dispersion parameter
h = 0.2 h = 0.4 h = 0.8
0 sA 11.12 7.86 6.53
sB 11.12 7.86 6.53
Welfare change 93,512 58,276 45,621
0.2 sA 14.57 11.09 21.11
sB 14.57 11.09 21.11
Welfare change 101,574 65,525 69,109
0.4 sA 18.47 30.04 30.03
sB 18.47 30.04 30.03
Welfare change 102,315 74,704 73,075
0.6 sA 37.48 39.52 39.85
sB 37.48 39.53 39.85
Welfare change 79,649 66,325 64,691
0.8 sA 50.57 50.88 51.77
sB 50.57 50.88 51.77
Welfare change 56,524 46,033 43,668
1 sA 65.52 66.27 68.03
sB 65.52 66.27 68.03
Welfare change 21,151 9355 5281
Fig. 7. NE tolls (min) as tax exporting parameter changes.
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pair decreases; that is to say, although all paths are used at least a small amount at any value of a, the number that are used
by a signiﬁcant amount of trafﬁc decreases. From an analysis of the resulting path ﬂows as the tolls increase, it is found that
with an increase in a, non-captive OD pairs begin to avoid using the tolled links by rerouting away from these less attractive
tolled links. This explains the apparent change in toll regime in Fig. 7 which notably appears at different levels of a for dif-
ferent dispersion parameters h. That is to say, sensitivity to costs (as controlled by h) has a complex interactive effect with the
assumption on tax-exporting behaviour (as controlled by a), at the NE solution.
Where the phenomenon of a change in the toll regime precisely occurs depends on both h and a, and this is difﬁcult to
predict a priori. But in general, as h increases, because users become more sensitive to costs, this would be expected to take
place at lower values of a. For example, for h = 0.2, there is a noticeable ‘‘break’’ at a = 0.6 and an NE toll of 37.48 compared to
the NE toll of 18.47 at a = 0.4. However, when users become more cost sensitive this ‘‘break’’ occurs earlier. We can see a
change between a = 0 and a = 0.2 for the case of h = 0.8.
If in the competitive (NE) case, some higher-level regulatory authority were able to inﬂuence the tax-exporting agree-
ment through a (given knowledge of h), so as to achieve the highest total welfare change, then we can see that the ‘optimum’
value occurs around a = 0.4 for all cases of h. The welfare gains achieved in such a way can be seen to be close to the beneﬁts
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the individual authorities, is that while there would be an incentive for the players to ‘collude’ in the non-cooperative game,
full collusion (as represented by a = 1) would result in lower welfare than partial collusion (a < 1). As explained above, this is
due to the local welfare function not taking full account of the total welfare effects. The fact that there is a close to global
regulator solution with a = 0.4 is most likely, we believe, to be network-speciﬁc and simply reﬂects that there is a trade-
off being made by the local decision makers with respect to revenues from neighbours and congestion impacts on their
own residents. Therefore, in any given network, any overall regulator of competition between cities would need to evaluate
NE solutions for varying a, in order to determine an optimal level of cooperation for the region as a whole.
5. Summary and conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed a model and mathematical formulation of competition between two city authorities as a
kind of two-level Nash game. On the upper level, each authority aims non-cooperatively to maximise social welfare of their
residents by exerting tolls on their own jurisdiction, anticipating the reactions of travellers while reacting to the tolls set by
the other authority. On the lower level, the travellers react to the tolls by non-cooperatively deciding whether to travel and if
so by which route. A particular feature we exploit is that under an elastic demand SUE model for the lower level, necessary
conditions for solutions to this problem can be written as a single-level variational inequality. We distinguish a form of local
and global solution (referred to as LNE and NE respectively) that are contained within the set of solutions to the variational
inequality problem. In our tests, we have shown how one general algorithm for solving such problems, namely SLCP, was
successful at determining such solutions.
In our numerical experiments, we show that authorities, when allowed to retain the full stream of revenues from pricing
(‘‘full tax-exporting’’), have an incentive to charge a toll higher than that obtained under the Global Regulatory Problem
which is intended not only to internalise local congestion but also to extract revenues from users outside their jurisdiction.
However, the resulting effect in physically adjacent regions (modelled as networks with serial dependencies) leads to so-
called double marginalisation (Economides and Salop, 1992; De Borger et al., 2007). The consequence of double marginal-
isation is reduced beneﬁts from pricing leading to a Prisoner’s Dilemma outcome (Zhang et al., 2011). As shown in
Example 1, toll competition could result in an even worse outcome than not tolling at all. As shown in Example 2, the bene-
ﬁts of toll competition could be lower than taking cooperative action, though higher than no tolls at all.
In our experiments on alternative tax-exporting assumptions, it is seen that even if local authorities share revenues from
pricing, they might set tolls that are far from those that a global regulator would set. In these tests we saw that when
authorities fully keep the revenues from pricing, they would set a toll higher than the (second best) socially optimal toll
in order to retain the revenues which contribute to local welfare. The opposite occurs if they were to return the entire rev-
enue stream back to those who paid the toll. This happens because the tolls decided at a local level do not, in contrast to a
globally decided (second best) toll, imperfectly internalise externalities wherever they occur in the network. A locally decided
toll does not therefore take into account the full spectrum of interaction effects that result in congestion across the entire
network. Thus a potential policy implication of this research is that when pricing is decentralised to the local level, the
authorities need to take into account the interactions of all users rather than solely that of local users. Furthermore, it is
shown that even agreeing revenue recycling strategies (modelled with a common a parameter) will not necessarily offset
the disbeneﬁts associated with double marginalisation.
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